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ABSTRACT The safe and secure operation of critical infrastructure is dependent on appropriate responses
to safety, security, and operational priorities into integrated control and safety systems (ICSS), at design
stage and throughout the life of the system. Digitization as well as networked automation and control
infrastructures have increased in the past years and are leading to remarkable potential security risks. Recent
news about serious security incidents, such as the WannaCry ransomware, affecting the whole world are
heard more often. The objective of this paper is to come up with an integrated and optimised evaluation
framework for ICSS and related subsystems considering cybersecurity and safety. This can be achieved by the
alignment of the cybersecurity framework formulated by the National Institute of Standards and Technology
with safety and security standards ISA84 (IEC 61511) and ISA99 (IEC 62443), and the novel funnel risk
graph method. The need of such alignment between safety and security has been recognized by the research
community, the industry, as well as the International Society of Automation (ISA).
INDEX TERMS Integrated control and safety systems (ICSS), National Institute of Standards and Technol-
ogy (NIST), ISA84 (IEC 61511), ISA99 (IEC 62443), funnel risk graph method (FRGM).
I. INTRODUCTION
Cybersecurity threats exploit the organisation’s security,
economy, safety and health orchestrated by an augmented
complexity and connectivity of critical infrastructure sys-
tems. The oil and gas industry has a huge demand to protect
multi-billion mega project globally and is projected to spend
up to $1.87 billion on cybersecurity by 2018 [1], [2]. Cyberse-
curity risk affects a company’s bottom line similar to financial
and reputational risk. It can drive up costs and impact revenue.
It can damage an organisation’s ability to innovate and to gain
and maintain customers. In the past years, separate research
communities have dealt with threats to safety versus secu-
rity [3]. Two international standards have been proposed by
the ISA to address ICSS safety and security needs: ISA 84
standard (also called IEC 61511) on safety instrumented
systems (SIS) [4] and ISA 99 standard (also called IEC
62443) on control system security [5]. As ICSS are becoming
more complex and more integration of systems and sub-
systems required, the contrast between safety and security
is beginning to deteriorate. Collaboration between safety
and security [6] are starting to be of interest among
researchers [3], [7]. ISA has also identified a need of align-
ment between safety and security, and formed a working
group, Work Group 7 - Safety and Security, to investi-
gate alignment and common issues between security and
safety [8].
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows.
Section II, III, IV and V describes the NIST frame-
work, ISA 84, ISA 99 and FRGM. Related works is
presented in Section VI. Section VII discussed our pro-
posal overview and Section VIII, our novel detailed pro-
posal – the Alignment of NIST framework with the
FRGM enables evaluation of both security and safety using
an integrated scheme. Finally, Section IX concludes the
paper.
II. NATIONAL INSTITUE OF STANDARDS
AND TECHNOLOGY FRAMEWORK [9]
In February 2014, as directed by a presidential executive
order, the cybersecurity framework was published follow-
ing a collaborative process involving government agencies,
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FIGURE 1. NIST framework core.
industry, and academia. The NIST framework is a risk-based
approach to managing cybersecurity risk, and is composed
of three parts: the Framework Core, the Framework Imple-
mentation Tiers, and the Framework Profiles. Each Frame-
work component supports the connection between business
drivers and cybersecurity activities. These components are as
follows:
A. NIST FRAMEWORK CORE as depicted in Figure 1,
is a group of cybersecurity actions, preferred results,
and appropriate references that are collective across
critical infrastructure sectors.
It refers to practices, guidelines and industry standards
in a way that allows for communication of cybersecu-
rity activities and outcomes from top to bottom of the
organizational hierarchy. The NIST framework Core
comprises of five Functions—Identify, Protect, Detect,
Respond, Recover. This can be considered a high-
level approach of an organization’s cybersecurity risk
management.
B. NISTFRAMEWORKIMPLEMENTATIONTIERS
(‘‘Tiers’’) defines the extent to which an organization’s
cybersecurity risk management practices demonstrate
the characteristics defined in the NIST Framework.
There are four tiers (Partial, Risk Informed, Repeatable
and Adaptive) that provide perspective on how an
organization assess cybersecurity risk and the activities
in place to manage that risk. Definitions of Tiers are as
described below:
Tier 1 (Partial):
• RiskManagement Process – the approach to cyber-
security risk management practices are unplanned,
informal, and mitigative. Priority for cybersecurity
activities may be low.
• Integrated Risk Management Program – the
approach to managing awareness of cybersecurity
risk is limited or has not been established. The
organization may not have processes that enable
cybersecurity information to be shared within the
organization.
• External Participation – An organization may not
have the practices in place to collaborate with other
organizations.
Tier 2 (Risk Informed):
• RiskManagement Process – the approach to cyber-
security risk management practices are approved
by management but may not be strategically
throughout the organization.
• Integrated Risk Management Program – the
approach to managing awareness of cyberse-
curity risk is at the organizational level but
an organization-wide methodology to managing
cybersecurity risk has not been established.
• External Participation – The organization under-
stand its responsibility in the larger environment,
but does not have a formalized approach to impart
to external parties.
Tier 3 (Repeatable):
• Risk Management Process – The organization’s
risk management practices are officially approved
and communicated as policy.
• Integrated Risk Management Program – Manage-
ment of cybersecurity risk is an organization-wide
approach.
• External Participation – There is collaboration
among partners and risk-based management deci-
sions within the organization in response to
incidents.
Tier 4 (Adaptive Risk Management Process): There
is a process of continuous improvement wherein the
organization adapts its cybersecurity practices based on
lessons learned and predictive indicators derived from
previous and current cybersecurity activities.
• Integrated Risk Management Program – Cyber-
security risk management is embedded in the
organizational culture. Methodology in managing
cybersecurity risk is through organizational-wide
risk-informed policies, processes, and procedures
to address potential cybersecurity incidents.
• External Participation – A proactive, accurate and
up-to-date information is being distributed and
prior to cybersecurity incidents. There is an open
sharing of data among partners.
C. NIST FRAMEWORK PROFILE (‘‘Profile’’). The
Profile can be considered as the alignment of standards,
guidelines, and practices to the Framework Core. Pro-
files can be characterized as ‘‘gap analysis’’ to identify
opportunities for improving cybersecurity posture by
comparing a ‘‘Current’’ Profile (the ‘‘as found’’ state)
with a ‘‘Target’’ Profile (the ‘‘desired’’ state). The
result of the ‘‘gap analysis’’ between the Current Pro-
file and Target Profile can be used to aid prioritization
and extent of development.
To enable critical infrastructure suppliers to achieve flex-
ibility, the NIST framework depend on a range of existing
standards, guidelines, and practices. Based from these stan-
dards, guidelines, and practices, theNIST provides a structure
to conduct gap analysis from the current and target state,
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FIGURE 2. ISA 84 (IEC 61511) safety lifecycle phases [10].
prioritize improvement action plans, evaluate development
to attain the desired target state and communicate among
relevant stakeholders about cybersecurity risk.
III. ISA 84 (IEC 61511) - SAFETY INSTRUMENTED
SYSTEM (SIS) STANDARD [4], [10]
Part of this proposal is to align safety standard to cyber-
security. In oil and gas, petrochemical and process indus-
tries, SIS is implemented to safely ‘secure liquid inside the
pipe’ or keep a process under control from hazardous pro-
cesses, and ensure that the instrumentation for functional
safety is in place. These SIS have been used for many years
to perform safety instrumented functions (SIF). It is essential
that this instrumentation achieve certain minimum standards
and performance levels if instrumentation is to be effectively
used for SIF. This standard [10], which safety lifecycle is
shown in Figure 2, addresses the application of SIS for the
process industries. It also requires a process hazard and risk
assessment to be carried out to enable the specification for
safety instrumented systems to be derived. The risk assess-
ment phase is proposed to be conducted using the Funnel Risk
Graph Method (FRGM) and will be discussed in Section V.
The safety instrumented system includes all components and
subsystems necessary to carry out the safety instrumented
function from sensor(s) to final element(s). This standard [10]
is well-known and will not be discussed in detail.
IV. ISA 99 (IEC 62443) – INDUSTRIAL AUTOMATION AND
CONTROL SYSTEMS SECURITY
ISA 99 (IEC 62443) [11] aims to establish an industrial
automation and control system security program, and is inher-
ently referenced with the NIST framework. Figure 3 [5]
represents the elements of the cyber security management
system, which has three main categories:
• Risk analysis,
• Addressing risk with the Cybersecurity Manage-
ment (CSMS), and
• Monitoring and improving the CSMS
FIGURE 3. ISA 99 (IEC 62443) [5].
While safety is aimed at protecting the systems from acci-
dental failures to eliminate or minimize hazards, security is
focused on protecting the systems from deliberate malicious
attacks [6]. Technology in the past did not demand automa-
tion systems to be integrated and connected to the Inter-
net. However, due to the proliferation of Internet-connected
systems, security has become increasingly important. Even
though SIS is typically not connected to the outside world,
malicious hacking is still not impossible. With this vulnera-
bility, it is proposed that SIS cybersecurity risk assessment
should be included in its design and evaluation. The stan-
dard [11] elaborates the elements and provides guidance on
what should be included for the establishment of an organi-
zation’s cybersecurity management system (CSMS) for ICSS
as a whole, in which SIS is part of. The CSMS elements
pertain in this standard are majority discussed about policy,
procedure, practice and personnel management suggesting
what should be part of the organization’s CSMS.
V. FUNNEL RISK GRAPH METHOD (FRGM) [6]
In [6], an application of a more cost-effective, simplified, and
enhanced approach for the design and evaluation of Safety
Instrumented Systems (SIS) called the Funnel Risk Graph
Method (FRGM) was presented in Figure 4.
Instead of subjecting all SIF one-by-one to a much com-
plex (semi-quantitative or quantitative) assessment process,
the FRGM (qualitative) is aimed to use as a funnel or an
‘‘initial pass’’. If the assessed safety-related systems received
SIL allocation of greater than SIL2 during the ‘‘initial pass’’
then a semi-quantitative or a quantitative method as a ‘‘final
pass’’ should be conducted, or the multi-disciplinary assess-
ment team reached an agreement to justify the ‘‘second
pass’’, or pose a high Equipment Under Control (EUC) risk.
The 16 phase IEC61508 safety lifecycle with the inclu-
sion of IEC62061, IEC61511, ISO13849 and AS4024.1 as
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FIGURE 4. The funnel risk graph method [6].
a combined safety lifecycle process [12] aims to establish
safety requirements for plant, considering the specific cir-
cumstances and risks (e.g., environmental, operational, etc.)
associated with its use, maintenance until the duration of the
life of the plant.
The following phases of the safety lifecycle should be
driven by the end-user to ensure that the safety requirements
are appropriate for the specific application:
Phase 1: Concept
Phase 2: Scope
Phase 3: Hazard and Risk Analysis
Phase 4: Overall Safety Requirements
Phase 5: Safety Requirements Allocation
Phase 9: Safety Requirements Specification
The following phases of the safety lifecycle should be
driven by the end-user to ensure that the safety requirements
are adequately implemented and maintained:
Phase 6: Operation and Maintenance Planning
Phase 7: Safety Validation Planning
Phase 13: Safety Validation
Phase 14: Operations and Maintenance
Phase 15: Modification and Retrofit
Phase 16: Decommissioning
The responsibility for some of the realization phases of
the safety lifecycle may be assigned to other organisation,
however, it remains the end-user’s responsibility to ensure
that the other organisation complies with the requirements of
Phase 8-12. FRGM focuses on Phase 5: Safety Requirements
Allocation.
Phase 8: Installation and Commissioning Planning
Phase 10: E/E/PE Safety-related Systems Realisation
Phase 11: Other Risk Reduction Measures Specification
and Realisation
Phase 12: Installation and Commissioning
FIGURE 5. Merged ISA 84 (IEC 61511) and ISA 99 (IEC 62443)
lifecycles [13].
VI. RELATED WORK
There have been a few studies relating to the alignment of
safety and security. Some of them are enumerated below.
A. ALIGNMENT BETWEEN SAFETY AND SECURITY
STANDARDS ISA 84 (IEC 61511) AND
ISA 99 (IEC 62443) [13]
The alignment is derived by merging safety and secu-
rity lifecycle phases and is called the Failure-Attack-
CounTermeasure (FACT) as the graph shown in Figure 5.
It incorporates safety artefacts (fault trees and safety coun-
termeasures) and security artefacts (attack trees and security
countermeasures), and can be used during safety and security
alignment analysis [13].
This proposed alignment between safety and security aims
to ensure consistent implementation and help the organization
to scrutinize latest system weaknesses, to ultimately provide
necessary level of safety and security countermeasures.
The merged safety and security lifecycle model shown
in Figure 5, which composed of 14 phases. The process begins
with safety risk assessment and design phases (phases 1 – 4),
borrowed from ISA 84 (IEC 61511), followed by security
risk assessment and design phases (phases 5 – 9), from
ISA 99 (IEC 62443). The alignment between safety and
security is conducted in phase 10. The final phase of the
lifecycle, phases 11-14 are the merged phases of ISA 84 and
ISA 99 lifecycles and include validation, development, and
verification, operation and maintenance, safety and security
monitoring and periodic assessment, and modification and
decommissioning related activities.
B. INTEGRATING INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEM (ICS)
SAFETY AND SECURITY [14]
This study [14] proposes some techniques that can be used,
and potentially development of ICS security. This provides a
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FIGURE 6. Safety, security and operational output Stream [14].
FIGURE 7. V-model Lifecycle [10].
logical and structured approach through continual consider-
ation of the effect of decisions on pre-determined and prior-
itized safety, security and operational functions throughout
the design and implementation lifecycle. It proposes some
techniques that can be employed in whole or part, are scal-
able and are suitable for further investigation, and poten-
tially development by one of the groups currently looking at
ICS security.
Figure 6 shows the interconnection among activities
involved in defining safety, security and operational func-
tions. It is important that each activity stream (Safety, Secu-
rity and Operational output) must be performed by specialists
on their field and then collaboration among them is crucial to
the success of the activities.
Several stages need to be conducted to define safety, secu-
rity and operational functions, define ICS architecture, and
once an architecture has been decided, this can be inputted
into a design lifecycle. The design lifecycle is based on
a V-model as shown in Figure 7.
C. SAFETY AND SECURITY AWARE FRAMEWORK FOR THE
DEVELOPMENT OF FEEDBACK CONTROL SYSTEMS [15]
This study [15] is for the military drive-by-wire land systems
and civilian vehicles. The fundamental part of the study
is to proposed a framework consists of a Simulink model
for the development of feedback control system as shown
in Figure 8.
The structure of the framework was presented in a manner
that aligns safety and security within the design stage in
a modular concept. These systems often include network
enabled capability (NEC) allowing the use of electronics
architectures to integrate different sub-systems. However,
like ICSS, this increased complexity of integration capability
is accompanied with augmented safety and cybersecurity
risks. The study analyzes how the process of developing feed-
back control system for military land systems could benefit
from the use of a framework that addresses safety and security
issues at the system modelling level. Figure 9 shows each of
the modules except the Control Input Unit Modules (CIUMs)
and the Control Output Unit Modules (COUMs) is made of
the sub-modules.
D. ANALYSIS OF THESE METHODS
The presented methods in integrating safety and security
were good theoretical approach, however, they lack eco-
nomic justification and/or practicality. FACT graph method
showing merging of ISA 84 (IEC 61511) and ISA 99
(IEC 62443) lifecycles did not demonstrate economic viabil-
ity. Likewise, safety, security and operational output stream
did not expound the practical aspect of the said approach.
Similarly, the development of feedback system utilizing
safety and security framework did not present practical quan-
tifiable benefits.
VII. OUR PROPOSAL – OVERVIEW
Our core proposal is a seamless integration of cybersecu-
rity framework by the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) [9] with safety and security standards
ISA 84 (IEC 61511) [10] and ISA 99 (IEC 62443) [110], and
the novel Funnel Risk Graph Method (FRGM) as shown in
Figure 4. Economic benefits and practicality are presented.
The Functions [9] can be conducted in parallel and con-
stantly to address the changing cybersecurity and safety risk.
Except Risk Assessment and FRGM, functions below are
not envisioned to form a sequential path or come to a final
complete state, rather it is dynamic.
• Identify – The activities in this function are the build-
ing block for operative use of the NIST and FRGM
framework. This includes development of the organiza-
tional understanding to manage cybersecurity and safety
risk to systems, assets, data, and capabilities. Expected
outcome categories within this function include: Asset
Management; Business Environment; Governance; Risk
Assessment; and Risk Management Strategy as shown
in Figure 10.
• Risk Assessment – This can serve as risk assessment
for cybersecurity and for safety. The organization’s risk
management process can be utilized to analyze the oper-
ational environment to distinguish the likelihood and
impact of a cybersecurity event. For safety, the organi-
zation can utilize FRGM [6]:
• FRGM [6] – Use FRGM instead of using traditional
standard methods such as Fault Tree Analysis (FTA),
Event Tree Analysis (ETA) and semi-quantitative
method Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA).
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FIGURE 8. Top level architecture of the Simulink model of the framework [15].
FIGURE 9. Processing segmentation inside the main modules of the framework [15].
• Protect – The Protect function supports the ability to
constraint or exclude the impact of a potential cyber-
security incident by development of appropriate mea-
sures. Expected outcome categories within this Func-
tion include: Access Control; Awareness and Training;
Data Security; Information Protection Processes
and Procedures; Maintenance; and Protective
Technology.
• Detect – The Detect function facilitates suitable
detection of cybersecurity incidents through develop-
ment of appropriate activities. Expected outcome cat-
egories within this function includes: Anomalies and
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FIGURE 10. Overview of the alignment framework.
Events; Security Continuous Monitoring; and Detection
Processes.
• Respond – Mitigative action regarding an identified
cybersecurity incident.
• ISA 99 (IEC 62443) – NIST framework is inherently
referenced with ISA 99.
• Recover - The Recover function supports timely recov-
ery to normal operations to reduce the impact from a
cybersecurity event.
VIII. OUR DETAILED PROPOSAL: ALIGNMENT OF THE
NIST FRAMEWORK [9] WITH THE FRGM [6]
A. ALIGNMENT OF THE NIST FRAMEWORK
WITH THE FRGM
Figure 11 shows our detailed proposed framework for the
alignment of NIST with FRGM. The framework can be used
to create a new cybersecurity and safety program or improve
an existing program. These steps are iterative process until
appropriate stage has been reached. This can be achieved
using the following steps.
Step 1 (NIST – Identify, Scope and Prioritize): At a high-
level, the organization identifies its business/mission objec-
tives. With this information, the organization makes strategic
decisions regarding cybersecurity and safety implementa-
tions and determines the scope of systems and assets that sup-
port the selected business line or process. Scoping includes
identification and inventory of all assets involved. Using the
NIST framework as show in Figure 11, the Identify step is
performed. The activities in the Identify Function provides
groundwork for are foundational for valuable use of NIST.
Understanding the business context, the resources that sup-
port critical functions, and the related cybersecurity risks
enables an organization to focus and prioritize its efforts, con-
sistent with its risk management strategy and business needs.
The activities in the Identify stage are shown in Figure 11 that
includes, Asset Management, Business Environment, Gover-
nance, Risk Assessment and Risk Management Strategy.
Step 1.1 (NIST + FRGM - Perform a Risk Assess-
ment (ID.RA)): The organization’s risk management process
can be utilise to analyse the operational environment to dis-
tinguish the likelihood and impact of a cybersecurity (using
ISA 99) event and safety (using ISA 84). This is where
the proposed integration of NIST and FRGM takes place.
Highlighted boxes in Figure 11 are the path towards FRGM.
The combined safety lifecycle process on Phase 5: Safety
Requirements Allocation using the FRGM was based on [10]
in reference to the general scheme described in [16] but
characterized as a ‘‘funnel’’ approach. Typically, a medium-
sized plant is comprised of thousands of SIF. Instead of
subjecting all SIF one-by-one to a much complex (semi-
quantitative or quantitative) assessment process, the FRGM
(qualitative) is aimed to use as a funnel or an ‘‘initial pass’’.
If the assessed safety-related systems received SIL allocation
of greater than SIL2 during the ‘‘initial pass’’ then a semi-
quantitative or a quantitative method as a ‘‘final pass’’ should
be conducted, or the multi-disciplinary assessment team
reached an agreement to justify the ‘‘second pass’’, or pose
a high EUC risk.
The three (3) steps to the FRGM approach are as follows:
Step 1: Select one parameter (say Consequence C2 param-
eter) from Figure 4;
Step 2: Chosen parameters are then linked to other param-
eters (Exposure, Probability, Demand W);
Step 3: Resolve the SIL allocated to the SIF.
For example, Consequence C2, Frequency F1, Probability
P1 with demand W3 would yield a SIL1. But if the Proba-
bility changes to P2 with the same condition, then SIL2 is
allocated.
The FRGM approach can also be utilized to enable assess-
ment of SIS where the potential consequences include severe
environmental impact or property loss.
Step 2 (NIST - Protect): This step involves development
and implementation of the required appropriate defenses
deployed to critical infrastructure services. The expected
result of this step includes Access Control, Awareness and
Training, Data Security, Information Protection Processes
and Procedures, Maintenance and Protective Technology as
shown in Figure 11. This is part of the preventative measures
of the Framework.
Step 3 (NIST - Detect): This step involves development and
implementation of applicable activities to identify the occur-
rence of a cybersecurity event. This function enables timely
discovery of cybersecurity events. Some of the examples of
result include Anomalies and Events, Security Continuous
Monitoring and Detection Processes. This function is critical
such that detection process must be effective to determine real
threats and vulnerabilities.
Step 4 (NIST - Respond): This step involves development
and implementation of applicable activities to take action
regarding a detected cybersecurity event. The Respond func-
tion supports the ability to contain the impact of a potential
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FIGURE 11. Detailed framework for the alignment of NIST and FRGM.
cybersecurity event. Examples of outcome categories within
this function include Response Planning, Communications,
Analysis, Mitigation and Improvements.
Step 5 (NIST - Recover): This step involves development
and implementation of applicable activities to maintain plans
for resilience and to restore any capabilities or services that
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were affected due to a cybersecurity event. The Recover
function supports timely recovery to normal operations to
reduce the impact from a cybersecurity event. Examples of
outcome categories within this function include Recovery
Planning, Improvements and Communications. Restoration
test activities are important to this step.
B. ADVANTAGE OF THIS PROPOSAL
Alignment of safety and security has many advantages. Both
of them can utilise the same systems and assets that support
the selected business line or process. Evaluating them against
cybersecurity threats and safety risks using the integrated
NIST and FRGM framework in one approach could elimi-
nate or minimize loss to an organization thus entail economic
advantage. For safety risk assessment, given the complex-
ity of process industries, SIL and PL allocation should be
performed via a quantitative or semi-quantitative method-
ology. However, it may be impracticable to apply a semi-
quantitative or quantitative approach due to the substantial
amount of time and resources involved, thus FRGM [6]
approach is proposed as part of Step 4 above. Themain differ-
ence with this proposed technique is that, instead of jumping
in to costly and time-consuming methods (semi-quantitative
or quantitative), all SIF will first undergo FRGM (qualita-
tive), which usually takes only a few minutes for each SIF to
collaborate with a multi-disciplinary team assuming that cal-
ibration process has been completed. Only those SIF which
falls under the following category, which typically around
5% of the total SIF, will undergo a quantitative or semi-
quantitative method:
• SIF with SIL allocation of more than SIL2 during the
FRGM ‘‘initial pass’’.
• Did not achieve a satisfactory level of consensus within
the multi-disciplinary team during the ‘‘initial pass’’.
• Pose a high EUC risk.
In order to show the simplicity and effectiveness of the
FRGM, a block diagram of a conveyor safety system with
three SIF is presented in Figure 12.
C. SIF#1, SIF#2 AND SIF#3 ANALYSES
The process involves transporting and handling of solids
through a conveyor belt. All SIF is designed to disable any
movement of the conveyor belt and its associated equipment
during emergency or metal detection. SIF#1 safety switches
activation is done via pulling the trip cable or from a broken
trip cable i.e., total loss of tension on it. The two Normally-
Close (NC) switches are connected in series; opening of
the contacts of any of the two switches will activate the
SILBUS/PILZ relay system and trips the conveyor. A bea-
con light is also connected to indicate switch activation.
SIF#2 metal detector is used to sense any unwanted presence
of metal in the conveyor and eventually disable conveyor
movement. SIF#3 operator lanyard safety switches have sim-
ilar function to SIF#1. However, the risk is located near to
the operator station, where permanent exposure or almost
FIGURE 12. Block diagram of conveyor safety system.
FIGURE 13. SIF#1 – A100 - safety switch.
permanent exposure is evident. The collaborative risk assess-
ment [16] was conducted by a team of multi-disciplinary
personnel which was composed of process control engineer,
process specialist, safety specialist, control room and field
operators with combined work experience of over 100 years.
Figure 13 shows the safety switch - SIF#1 – A100 and was
evaluated using the proposed FRGM. The FRGM serves as an
‘‘initial pass’’ before going into a much complex assessment
process, if required. Using the FRGM steps mentioned in
Section VIII, Step 1.1:
Step 1: Select one parameter (Consequence C3 parameter
was selected). C3 – Permanent disability or fatality;
Step 2: Chosen parameters are then linked to other param-
eters (Exposure F1, Probability P1, and Demand W3).
F1 – rare to frequent exposure, P1 – avoidance is possible
under certain conditions, W3 – function is demanded more
than once per year;
Step 3: Resolve the SIL allocated to the SIF.
In this case, it was easily evaluated that the SIL for SIF#1 –
A100 is SIL 2 as shown in Figure 14. Since this is only
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FIGURE 14. Result of SIF#1 using FRGM.
TABLE 1. Calibration of risk graph.
TABLE 2. Summary of risk assessment and allocations using FRGM for
SIF#1, SIF#2 and SIF#3.
SIL 2, it can be used as the assessed SIL. If the assessed
safety-related system received SIL allocation of greater than
SIL 2, during the ‘‘initial pass’’ then a semi-quantitative or a
quantitative method as a ‘‘final pass’’ should be conducted.
This is true in the case of SIF#3 – A200, which received
TABLE 3. Comparison between Standard Method and FRGM.
TABLE 4. Summary of risk assessment and allocations using
LOPA – SIF#1 – A100.
a SIL 3. Since this SIF demands a higher safety function, it is
justified that it will undergo a more complex process such as
quantitative methodology.
At the discretion of themulti-disciplinary assessment team,
they can come into an agreement to justify the ‘‘final pass’’
even though the outcome of FRGM is SIL 2 or less. Further
justification for a final pass also includes those SIFs that
are involved in preventing or mitigating high consequence
events and which are the only risk control against a risk.
Using the FRGM and corporate calibrated risk graph shown
in Table 1, the result of safety risk assessment is shown
in Table 2. SIL 2 is required for SIF#1 – A100, SIL 1 for
SIF#2 –M100 and SIL 3 for SIF#3 – A200.
Table 3 shows the comparative differences between the
standard quantitative methods such as FTA, ETA and
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semi-quantitative method LOPA, as compared to the pro-
posed FRGM approach at 3,000 SIF. Cost reduction is
realised by the number of hours spent by a multi-disciplinary
team. Pros and cons using the proposed FRGM approach as
compared to the standard approach are also shown in Table 3.
The coarser or less accurate assessment of risk using the
FRGM is not a concern as it is used as a funnel from a
broad range of SIL 0 to SIL 2. Interestingly, the same safety
function can be achieved using any of the methodology as
shown in Table 4. A lot of resources can be saved using the
simple FRGM.
IX. CONCLUSION
Safety and security are two key properties of ICSS. Safety
focuses at protecting the systems from accidental faults, while
security is aimed at protecting the systems from intentional
attacks. Evaluating both safety and cybersecurity into an
integrated framework is aimed at process optimisation and ‘to
leave no stone unturned’ using a single unified methodology.
In this age of oil and gas economic downturn, an organisation
should improve its processes and procedures to concentrate
on its core objective. The safe and secure operation of crit-
ical oil and gas infrastructure is dependent on appropriate
responses to safety, security and operational priorities into
ICSS, at design stage and throughout the life of the sys-
tem. The objective of this proposal is to come up with an
integrated and optimised evaluation framework of ICSS and
related subsystems considering cybersecurity and safety. This
can be achieved by the alignment of the NIST cybersecu-
rity framework with safety and security standards ISA 84
(IEC 61511) and ISA 99 (IEC 62443), and the FRGM.
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